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Abstract: Initiatives on the sustainable intensification of agriculture have introduced improved
technologies tailored to farmers’ local conditions by trial demonstration with free provision of
improved seeds and fertilizers. It is not clear, though, whether smallholder farmers would be willing
to pay for these technologies, and what factors determine their informed demand. Using a contingent
valuation experiment, combined with information at baseline from 400 households in Northern
Tanzania, this study measured farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for hybrid maize seed and local
inorganic fertilizer. Farmers’ WTP was estimated using a dichotomous contingent valuation model
with follow-up. Results showed that the average WTP was 61% higher for hybrid maize seed and
15% lower for inorganic fertilizer than their average local market prices during the reference period,
suggesting that farmers were willing to pay a premium for hybrid maize seed, while they did not seem
to be interested in fertilizer purchase at current market price. Moreover, since improved access to
extension services was found to influence farmers’ WTP positively, strengthening extension services
could be a suitable policy intervention to increase farmers’ demand for improved technologies.
On the other hand, farmers’ risk aversion negatively affected WTP for both technologies. This result
suggests that encouraging risk reduction options, such as agricultural insurance, could be one policy
recommendation for boosting farmers’ demand for improved agricultural technologies.
Keywords: sustainable intensification; willingness to pay; double-bounded contingent valuation;
risk aversion; Tanzania
1. Introduction
Smallholder households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are overwhelmingly dependent on
agriculture that has shown little productivity improvement until the last century. After a relatively
stagnant growth of agricultural productivity over several decades [1,2], African agriculture has started
showing early signs of productivity growth since early 2000 [3–5]. The slow agricultural growth
is usually attributed to a relatively low use of improved technologies, including hybrid seeds and
fertilizers [1,4]. Hence, a viable policy option to increase agricultural productivity is through the
increased adoption of improved agricultural technologies, including hybrid seeds and fertilizers.
Various programs have been initiated by governments and the donor community, aimed at sustainably
intensifying the agricultural sector through the promotion of these technologies. From a development
policy perspective, nonetheless, it would be important to know whether farmers are willing to pay
for these technologies and, in addition, the factors that influence their willingness to pay (WTP).
It would also be interesting to assess whether there are discrepancies between WTP and market price,
an important factor that shapes the rate of technology diffusion.
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Free or subsidized supply of agricultural inputs is among the policy options being pursued to
increase technology adoption and spur agricultural growth in Africa. For example, more than 6
billion US dollars were committed to support the region’s smallholder agriculture sector as of 2009,
with the largest share (43%) devoted to the direct provision of agricultural inputs or training [6].
In their synthesis of input subsidy programs across ten African countries, Jayne and Rashid [7] found
expenditures on these programs to account for more than 30% of total public spending on agriculture.
In hindsight, such input distribution by the public sector could compromise the incentive for the
private sector to actively engage in the input supply market [8].
Like for most Sub-Saharan African countries, Tanzania’s economy is heavily dependent on
agricultural production, with 80% of the population employed in agriculture and 31% of the country’s
overall GDP derived from this sector [9]. Agriculture is predominantly smallholder-based, with a
mean land holding capacity of around 1.2 hectares, where an average small family farm generates
a gross income of about 5032 USD (in constant 2009 international dollar) per year [10]. In its effort
to promote improved agricultural technologies, the Government of Tanzania subsidized the price of
seeds and fertilizers annually from 2007 to 2014 through the National Agricultural Input Voucher
Scheme (NAIVS) [11]. However, after the termination of NAIVS in 2014, only around one-third of the
beneficiaries have continued to purchase fertilizers, showing the limited success of the program in
ensuring sustained technology adoption [11]. As such, a better understanding of the drivers of adoption
and farmers’ WTP is essential to identify appropriate policy interventions for encouraging adoption.
Risk perception is among the factors that discourage farmers’ adoption of new technologies [12–16].
Starting with Binswanger’s research [17,18], many studies [15,19–23] have empirically measured risk
aversion through field experiments and found farmers to be generally risk averse. However, there is a
dearth of empirical evidence on the importance of producers’ risk aversion in influencing farmers’ WTP.
This study elicited farmers’ WTP for improved seed and fertilizer among smallholders, through
a stated preference-based contingent valuation (CV) experiment conduced in 2015. We specifically
investigated the determinants of WTP for hybrid maize seed and inorganic fertilizer, including the role
of farmers’ risk aversion. The empirical analysis combined primary household survey data and WTP
elicitation using a CV experiment in the Babati district of Northern Tanzania. While most CV studies
in developing countries have focused on consumer preferences [24], our work focused on producers’
preferences in a developing country context, contributing to limited existing applications of CV in
these settings.
This paper unfolds in the following way. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on
demand for agricultural technologies and the CV approach. Section 3 describes our experimental
design, technologies, and data. The econometric framework is presented in Section 4. Empirical results
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with some development policy implications.
2. Willingness to Pay and Contingent Valuation of Agricultural Technology
In recent years, many research-for-development projects have been promoting improved seeds
and fertilizers for agricultural intensification. These projects promote agricultural productivity
from available land resources without impacting the environment. The ongoing CGIAR center-led
projects, such as the Cereal Systems Initiative for South Asia, and the Africa Research in Sustainable
Intensification for the Next Generation are two such examples. An important question in this regard is
the extent to which farmers are willing to pay for these technologies. WTP is usually defined as the
maximum amount that an individual would be willing to pay for a good or service without losing
their utility [25,26]. Farmers’ WTP may depend on many interrelated factors, such as socio-economic
and demographic characteristics, access to market and infrastructure, quality of available inputs,
and individual risk preference. Approaches for assessing WTP can broadly be categorized into two
categories—revealed and stated preference. In the revealed preference approach, participants bid real
money for real products, and hence can provide unbiased estimates of WTP, but such market data are
hardly available. In the stated preference approach, WTP is elicited based on a hypothetical situation.
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Hence, and in spite of being more convenient, stated preference approaches are prone to hypothetical
bias. One of the most important WTP valuation methods is CV, which involves field experiments and
survey data collection to elicit the stated preferences of participants. Other important stated preference
approaches are discrete choice experiments (DCE), where preferences are elicited from responses to
hypothetical alternatives, and experimental auctions, where participants’ bids are incentive-compatible.
In the simplest CV form, with the dichotomous choice model, an individual is asked if they are
willing to pay a stated amount for a product or service. Nonetheless, with this approach, the individual
provides little information with respect to their WTP, implying that relatively large samples are needed
for an accurate estimation of WTP. Hanemann et al. [25] suggested an alternative strategy to the simple
CV to improve the efficiency of the estimation, known as dichotomous CV, with follow-up questions or
a double-bounded (DB) CV model. Unlike the simple CV, the DB CV involves two questions—the first
on whether the respondent is willing to pay a stated amount for a service or product; and the second
about their WTP for a higher (lower) amount if they are (are not) willing to pay the initial bid. Within
this framework, the true WTP lies between the two offered bid prices if either response is positive,
between the second bid and the limit of the WTP if both responses are positive, and below the second
bid if both responses are negative.
Another improvement, initially recommended by Cooper [27] and Kanninen [26] and implemented
in several studies e.g., [28,29], is that the random variation of initial bid prices among the respondents
can eliminate bias that may result from the suggestion of a specific initial bid price. The main criticism
of the simple CV is called hypothetical bias, which means that people tend to overstate the amount they
would be ideally willing to pay for a good as compared to when they actually pay for it. Cummings
and Taylor [30] introduced an alternative approach called a cheap talk script, which clarifies the
problem of this hypothetical bias to participants prior to administration of the valuation question.
However, some literature [31,32] show that the cheap talk approach does not reduce willingness to pay
for knowledgeable participants. In this study, we employ the DB CV and randomly assign initial bid
prices to minimize bias.
Existing evidence shows that when markets are unregulated and unmonitored, as is mostly the
case in many developing countries, markets for seed and fertilizer typically fail due to asymmetric
information [33]. Bold et al. [33] found significant quality uncertainty of fertilizers and hybrid maize
seeds in Ugandan market, which they called a “market for lemons” problem, akin to low-quality used
cars, which were called with the same term, initially coined by Akerlof [34]. Their results suggested
that 30% of nutrients were missing in fertilizers and that locally sold hybrid maize seed contained less
than 50% authentic seeds. The supply of low-quality inputs in such markets can reduce farmers’ WTP
for (and return from) inputs. In the presence of market failures, attributes of inputs as well as farmer
adoption decisions will affect WTP, thereby making the revealed preference approach the preferred
analytical method for measuring WTP.
In our experiment, the studied farmers receive hybrid maize seeds and chemical fertilizers along
with training to gain knowledge and experience in the season prior to the implementation of the WTP
experiment. Since the quality of seeds and fertilizers is guaranteed, and our objective is to elicit farmers’
WTP for these authentic technologies, the stated preference approach using DB CV method is more
appropriate compared to a revealed preference approach. Although the stated preference approach
has been criticized for embedding effect, e.g., [35], the bias is much lower when responses are based on
marketable goods, as in our case, than on non-marketable goods.
3. Study Design, Technologies, and Data
Data for this study were collected in the Babati district in Northern Tanzania, where a systems-based
agricultural research for development program, called Africa Research In Sustainable Intensification for
the Next Generation (Africa RISING https://africa-rising.net/), has been implemented since early 2012.
As part of a broader research initiative aimed at evaluating the Africa RISING program, the authors
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conducted a CV study for hybrid maize seed and inorganic fertilizer in three villages—Long, Sabilo,
and Seloto—that represent different agro-ecological zones (mapped in Figure 1).
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Figure 2. Study design.
Careful attention was given to questionnaire design and its correct field implementation, both
being fundamental elements of a DB CV to ensure accurate economic valuation of the underlying good.
Since an unrealistic bid price range can lead to a starting point bias in the DB CV approach [36], we
proposed a realistic bid range. For both inputs, five initial bid prices—prevailing market price, two set
of prices above and below the market price—were randomly assigned to each participating respondent.
As noted before, random variation in bid prices among survey respondents can significantly enhance
the efficiency of CV estimation [26,27]. Survey respondents were either the household head or the
spouse—whoever was the main agricultural production decision maker. Response to the initial bid
price was coded as “Yes”, “No”, or “Not sure”. In the case of a “Not sure” response, the respondent
was offered a different initial bid price. When the response was “Yes” (“No”), the respondent was
asked a follow-up WTP question with a higher (lower) bid price than the pre-determined initial bid
prices. Figure 3 describes the structure of the DB CV design for fertilizer with an initial bid price of
32,000 TSH (about 14.5 USD) per 50 kg bag. Using this structure, participants’ unobserved WTP can be
narrowed down to one of the four intervals depicted in Figure 3.
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Since individual risk aversion also influences WTP and adoption decisions, we also elicited
farmers’ risk aversion preferences—usually varying with individual characteristics—using field-level
experiments with real monetary incentives [15,17–23]. Respondents were given 4000 TSH
(about 1.8 USD)—the equivalent of one day’s agricultural wage—as a token of appreciation for
their participation, and were asked if they would like to use it to bet on one of five lotteries with varying
risks and returns. Details on the risk preference elicitation experiment are provided in Appendix A.
4. Econometric Framework
We assumed that the true WTP for an input could be modeled using the linear function in
Equation (1):
WTPi(zi,ui) = z′i( j)β+ ui (1)
where zi( j) is a vector of explanatory variables for respondent i- or household j-level socio-economic
and demographic characteristics, β is the conformable vector of parameters, and ui is an independently
and identically distributed normal error term with mean zero and variance σ2. WTP was not directly
observed, but a range of WTP could be identified by using survey responses.
Depending on the answer to the initial bid, a second bid was given, which was higher than the
initial bid for a “Yes” response, and lower for a “No” response. Following [25], we called the initial bid
amount t1i and the second one t
2
i . The WTP for each household would then be in one of the following
four groups (G):
(G1) t1i ≤WTPi < t2i , if the individual answers yes to the first question and no to the second;
(G2) t2i ≤WTPi < ∞, if the individual answers yes both to the first and second questions;
(G3) t2i ≤WTPi < t1i , if the individual answers no to the first question and yes to the second;
(G4) 0 <WTPi < t2i , if the individual answers no both to the first and second questions.
The log-likelihood function of the WTP model was:
lnL =
∑
G1
ln
[
Φ
(
t2−z′β
σ
)
−Φ
(
t1−z′β
σ
)]
+
∑
G2
ln
[
1−Φ
(
t2−z′β
σ
)]
+
∑
G3
ln
[
Φ
(
t1−z′β
σ
)
−Φ
(
t2−z′β
σ
)]
+
∑
G4
ln
[
Φ
(
t2−z′β
σ
)] (2)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Using maximum likelihood
estimation, we estimated separate interval-censored models for both hybrid maize and fertilizer [29].
We directly estimated βˆ and σˆ, from which we could indirectly estimate WTP. Average WTP could be
obtained by E(WTP) = z′βˆ, where βˆ is the vector of parameter estimates. The underlying assumptions
behind this model are normality of the error term and identical valuation functions behind both the
initial and follow-up answers. Cameron and Quiggin [37] pointed out that that the identical valuation
functions assumption may fail in the case of initial bid price bias in the responses. In our case, the
random selection of the initial bid prices rendered the valuation functions identical. We implemented
the estimation in the Stata software package [29].
Among the covariates, household-specific characteristics, as well as access to market and
infrastructure, served as key determinants of household demand for new technologies. We included
individual risk aversion as an additional explanatory variable because, as discussed in the introduction,
this factor has long been recognized as a WTP constraint and barrier to technology adoption. Also,
the omission of risk preferences could bias the coefficient estimates of other covariates, such as
education and wealth, which could potentially be correlated with individual risk preference. Since
individual risk aversion is associated with barrier to technology adoption, its effect on WTP was
expected to be negative, given that farmers in low-income settings are mostly uninsured. Households’
wealth, education, awareness, and market access were all expected to be positively correlated.
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5. Empirical Results
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of key socio-economic characteristics of WTP respondents
and their households. The average household size of the sample was 6.7, whereas the average number of
working-age members in a household was 3.5. Only 11% households in the sample were female-headed.
The maximum adult years of education in a household was 9.7 years. Average household land holding
was about 1.5 ha, with a yield of main staple (maize) amounting to about 3.4 ton·ha−1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household size (number of members in a household) 6.67 2.81 1 17
Maximum adult years of education (years) 9.69 3.41 0 21
Female head of household (%) 11 0.31 0 1
Number of working age members (no.) 3.5 1.85 0 11
Land operated (ha) 1.44 1.20 0.00 12.95
Poor wealth (%) 74 0.44 0 1
Received coupon for seed and fertilizer (%) 40 0.49 0 1
Average maize yield (tons/ha) 3.38 1.31 0.50 10.19
Improved access to extension services (%) 20 0.40 0 1
Improved access to roads and markets (%) 50 0.50 0 1
Improved access to seed supplier (%) 51 0.50 0 1
Male WTP respondent (%) 61 0.49 0 1
Age of WTP respondent (years) 44.55 12.74 18 90
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 0.75 0.32 0 1
The variable “poor wealth” was an indicator that took a value of one if the household was in the
bottom two quartiles of total wealth index. We constructed a household-level aggregate wealth index
using housing condition (condition of the dwelling unit, such as materials used for the wall, floor, and
roof, source of drinking water, type of toilet, etc.), durable non-agricultural assets (including radio,
television, land-line phone, mobile phone, bicycle, motorbike), durable agricultural assets (including
sprayer, tractor, power tiller ox-ridger), and livestock ownership (cattle, equines, goats, sheep, chicken).
We computed the aggregate wealth index through factorial analysis using the principle component
factor (PCF) method. The higher the household wealth index, the wealthier the household. About 74%
of the households in the sample were poor by this measure. Improved access to roads and markets,
and better access to seed suppliers, were indicator variables that took the value of one if the household
was in the bottom two quartiles of the indices of access to roads and markets, and travel time to seed
supplier, respectively. About 50% of households in the sample reported improved access to roads,
markets, and seed suppliers. Improved access to extension services was an indicator on whether the
household had any contact with agricultural development/extension agents at least once during the
last cropping season. Only 20% of the sample had improved access to extension services.
Since one of the key objectives of this study was to investigate if individual risk aversion influences
farmers’ WTP, we ran an experiment to elicit farmer risk preferences. We used the expected utility
framework and followed Binswanger’ method [17,18] to design a game for eliciting individual risk
aversion. The description of risk preference elicitation experiment, along with the estimation of
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficients are provided in the Appendix A, with Table A1
summarizing the risk preference classification. Table A1 reports that about half of the sample showed
extreme risk aversion, whereas 5.5% showed risk-seeking behavior.
A summary of WTP bid prices and responses is presented in Table 2. The mean initial bid prices
for a 2 kg bag of hybrid maize seed and a 50 kg bag of fertilizer were 8,945 TSH and 32,018 TSH,
respectively. About 74% and 42% responded yes to the first contingent valuation question for hybrid
maize and fertilizer, respectively, suggesting a higher WTP for hybrid maize than fertilizer.
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Table 2. Willingness to pay (WTP) bid prices and responses.
WTP Bid Prices and Responses Mean Std. Dev.
Hybrid Maize Seed
Exogenous bid price for the first WTP question (WTP_1st) (TSH) 8945.00 3645.57
Response to WTP_1st is YES (%) 0.74 0.44
Endogenous bid price for the second WTP question (WTP_2nd) (TSH) 12,178.00 4399.63
Response to WTP_2nd is YES (%) 0.57 0.50
Response to WTP_1st = YES; Response to WTP_2nd = YES (%) 0.32 0.47
Response to WTP_1st = YES; Response to WTP_2nd = NO (%) 0.42 0.49
Response to WTP_1st = NO; Response to WTP_2nd = YES (%) 0.24 0.43
Response to WTP_1st = NO; Response to WTP_2nd = NO (%) 0.02 0.13
Inorganic Fertilizer
Exogenous bid price for the first WTP question (WTP_1st) (TSH) 32,017.50 11,858.70
Response to WTP_1st is YES (%) 0.42 0.49
Endogenous bid price for the second WTP question (WTP_2nd) (TSH) 33,727.50 21,236.07
Response to WTP_2nd is YES (%) 0.36 0.48
Response to WTP_1st = YES; Response to WTP_2nd = YES (%) 0.10 0.30
Response to WTP_1st = YES; Response to WTP_2nd = NO (%) 0.33 0.47
Response to WTP_1st = NO; Response to WTP_2nd = YES (%) 0.26 0.44
Response to WTP_1st = NO; Response to WTP_2nd = NO (%) 0.32 0.47
Observations 400
The average (endogenous) bid prices for the second contingent valuation question were 12,178 TSH
for hybrid maize and 33,728 TSH for fertilizer. About 57% and 36% of the respondents answered yes to
the second contingent valuation question for hybrid maize and fertilizer, respectively. As expected,
the share of respondents willing to accept the bid generally decreased with the bid value. Respondents
answering yes to both the first and the second WTP questions were significantly more for hybrid maize
(32%) than for fertilizer (10%).
Finally, WTP estimates are summarized in Table 3. The average WTP for a 2 kg bag of hybrid
maize seed was 12,893 TSH (about 5.8 USD), 61% higher than the prevailing local market price, while
the average WTP for a 50 kg bag of fertilizer was 27,086 TSH (about 12.3 USD), 15% lower than the
prevailing market price. Access to improved extension services influenced farmers’ WTP positively
for both hybrid maize seed and inorganic fertilizer, whereas farmer risk aversion preferences were
negatively and significantly correlated to WTP for both inputs. Females on average were willing to
pay relatively less for fertilizer than their male counterparts, while male WTP was lower for hybrid
maize seed than female. Household characteristics, such as household size, land size, maximum years
of education, and wealth, did not have a significant effect on WTP for both the technologies. This is
consistent with the findings of De Groote et al. [38], who did not find any significant association of
these household characteristics with consumers’ WTP for maize grain quality. Lusk [32] also found an
insignificant association of income and education with WTP in his analysis of preference for golden
rice. However, studies such as Kimenju and De Groote [39] and Krishna and Quaim [28] found
significant and positive influences of income and education on consumers’ WTP. From Table 3 we
see that although the coefficients associated with land size and wealth (poor) are not statistically
significant, they indeed have the expected sign for both hybrid seed and fertilizer. Table 3 also shows
that although statistically insignificant, the estimated parameter for receiving coupon is positive. Some
of the statistical significance may have to do with the relatively small sample we worked with.
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Table 3. Estimation of WTP for hybrid maize seed and fertilizer.
Hybrid Maize Seed Fertilizer
Coef. Se Coef. Se
Household size 74.613 114.915 585.370 602.806
Maximum adult years of education 33.031 87.012 659.873 457.718
Female head of household −301.041 880.276 −10,479.906 ** 4730.030
Number of working age members −74.904 192.866 −1120.359 1023.494
Land operated (ha) 313.561 261.363 109.658 1224.519
Poor wealth −293.649 643.712 −4402.484 3353.576
Received coupon for seed and fertilizer 626.124 520.078 2000.197 2709.407
Average maize yield (tons/ha) −3.213 200.028 1279.580 1052.284
Improved access to extension services 1401.618 ** 641.806 8599.780 *** 3308.499
Improved access to roads and markets 270.388 536.085 −997.427 2808.005
Improved access to seed supplier 293.161 535.485 −641.729 2799.271
Male WTP respondent −961.569 * 544.447 342.103 2846.452
Age of WTP respondent (years) −16.662 20.676 79.348 110.429
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) −1978.861 ** 809.170 −10,272.355 ** 4228.701
Constant 14,161.764 *** 1811.796 22,892.143 ** 9402.048
Sigma 4333.830 *** 216.599 23,763.570 *** 1253.986
Number of observations 395 395
Log-Likelihood −373.63 −496.40
chi2 22.525 31.097
p 0.068 0.005
Average willingness to pay 12,893.84 *** 259.916 27,086.41 *** 1367.243
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coef. = coefficient, Se = Standard error.
6. Conclusions and Implications
Using a contingent valuation experiment and primary household survey data from Northern
Tanzania, this study estimated farmers’ WTP for hybrid maize seed and local inorganic fertilizer.
We used a double bounded CV, where study participants were asked a follow-up bid that was higher
(lower) than the initial bid if the latter was accepted (rejected). The average WTP was found to be 61%
higher for hybrid maize seed and 15% lower for inorganic fertilizer compared to their average local
market prices during the reference period. Access to improved extension services was found to be
positively (and significantly) correlated with farmers’ WTP, whereas the opposite occurred for farmers’
risk aversion preferences.
Empirical results suggested that, on average, farmers were willing to pay a premium for hybrid
maize seed, while they did not seem to be interested in fertilizer purchase at current market price.
This was consistent with the relatively high adoption of hybrid maize and limited adoption of inorganic
fertilizer in the area. Since household interaction with agricultural extension agents positively affected
WTP, strengthening extension services could be a suitable policy intervention to increase farmers’
demand for improved agricultural technologies. While the promotion of sustainable intensification
projects that offer free provision of inputs may increase the likelihood of their adoption, assessing the
implication of farmers’ risk preferences is paramount. Given that the latter affected WTP negatively,
encouraging risk reduction options, such as agricultural insurance, to boost farmer demand for
improved agricultural technologies would be an additional suitable policy recommendation. However,
the relationship between risk preferences and farmers’ WTP may be confounded by other unobservable
characteristics, such as time preferences and individual ability, not controlled for in our framework
and to which further research should be devoted.
The estimated WTP values offer interesting market information signaling farmers’ acceptance
of technologies. While an estimated WTP for hybrid maize seed higher than market price suggest
the potential for increased adoption of this input, the promotion of inorganic fertilizer may require
interventions to reduce input costs to the farmers, including through targeted subsidies. Given the
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high potential for heavy subsidies to distort the relative cost of inputs, resulting in inefficient allocation,
further research is needed to generate evidence on the design and unintended consequences of such
interventions, including systematic targeting of specific farmer groups and/or crops. Although the
common criticism of upward bias in contingent valuation for tradable goods is less serious than
for non-tradable goods, further research is also recommended to compare our contingent valuation
WTP measures to the choice-theoretic marginal treatment effect parameters of WTP for farmers still
indecisive on technology adoption.
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Appendix A
Description of Risk Preference Elicitation Experiment
Binswanger [17,18] was the first to measure risk aversion using experimental design, taking the
case of rural India. He conducted the experiment with farmers by asking them to elicit choices between
lotteries involving a 50 percent chance of yielding a high or a low payoff. More recently, Holt and
Laury [19], Miyata [20], Vargas-Hill [21], Andersen et al. [40], Chantarat at al. [22], Tanaka et al. [23],
and Liu [15] have empirically measured farmers’ aversion to risk through similar field experiments.
At the end of the WTP contingent valuation survey, participants were given 4000 TSH—the
equivalent of one day of wages in the area—as a token of appreciation for their two-hour survey
participation. Households were provided with the option of either receiving 4000 TSH on the spot or
playing one among the following five lotteries: (1) 4400 TSH if head or 3600 TSH if tails; (2) 5200 TSH
if head or 2800 TSH if tails; (3) 6000 TSH if head or 2000 TSH if tails; (4) 7200 TSH if head or 800 TSH if
tails; and (5) 8000 TSH if head or 0 TSH if tails. Once a respondent chose a lottery option a coin was
tossed, and they received the payoffs indicated by heads and tails.
Following [17,22], we calculated six categories of risk aversion based on households’ choices. We
estimated the range of relative risk aversion coefficients for each of the six lottery choices under the
assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, given below:
E[U(P)] =
∑
k
pikU(Pk) =
∑
k
pik
 P1−Rk1−R
, (A1)
where utility function U′(P) > 0, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, and k = 1, 2. R is the CRRA coefficient and pi represents
the probability of possible payoff P. The range of R was calculated for each lottery that provided the
same utility for the associated payoffs: the upper (lower) bound was calculated as the value of R that
generated the same utility level for the payoffs associated with the selected lottery and the less (more)
risky adjacent alternative. Measures of CRRA were then calculated by the geometric mean of the range
of R. We assigned a value of zero to the CRRA value for game 5 (risk seekers) and a value equal to one
to the lottery choice #0 to represent extreme risk aversion class (Table A1).
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Table A1. Summary of risk aversion elicitation set-up.
Lottery
Choice
High
Payoff
Low
Payoff CRRA Ranges
Geometric
Mean CRRA
Risk Aversion
Class
Percent
HH
0 4000 4000 R > 0.99 1.0 Extreme 52.25
1 4400 3600 0.55 < R < 0.99 0.7 Severe 24.00
2 5200 2800 0.32 < R < 0.55 0.4 Intermediate 7.00
3 6000 2000 0.21 < R < 0.32 0.3 Moderate 8.75
4 7200 800 0 < R < 0.21 0.1 Low 2.50
5 8000 0 R < 0 0.0 Risk seeking 5.50
Note: Upper limit of CRRA was assumed to be 1.
The important aspect of the experiment was that the participants received actual monetary
payments and the payoff was significant relative to the average wage in the area. Several trial games
were first played, without providing actual payoffs, and then the lottery game was played for real
money. One frequent criticism of this type of experiment is that the measurement of risk preference is
biased because participants do not face actual loss. In his experiments in India, Binswanger [18] tested
this hypothesis by giving cash to the participants some days before the experiment, so that when they
played the lottery game, they put their money at risk and found the equivalence between opportunity
loss and real loss. In more recent literature, risk preference coefficients were estimated using structural
models. Antle [41] developed a moment-based approach to estimate risk aversion parameters for
agricultural producers. Being more direct and not subject to model or estimation assumptions, lottery
experiments to elicit risk preferences are still deemed reliable.
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